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I. INTRODUCTION
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence are a "legislative enactment" to be
construed by the "traditional tools of statutory construction." 2 While this
pronouncement is consistent with that made in numerous cases in which the
Court has employed "legislative intent" as a guiding principle in construing the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 3 the Court has never fully explicated the underlying
basis for its treatment of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute. In
actuality, the Federal Rules of Evidence have very little in common with a
typical statute. Most fundamentally, the Federal Rules of Evidence originated
in, and were designed by, the judicial branch and not the legislative branch. 4 In
addition, the role of Congress in the process that generated the Federal Rules of
Evidence was largely passive. Congress' primary function was to enact into
law the will and intent of the Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee.5
Moreover, the judicial branch designed the Federal Rules of Evidence to
operate as guidance for the exercise of discretion within the federal judiciary,
and consequently, the Rules' intended function is very much unlike that of most
statutes. 6 Based on all of these considerations, the primary thesis of this Article
is that application of the doctrine of "legislative intent" is functionally and
substantively misplaced in the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; B.A. University of
Cincinnati, 1969; J.D. Harvard University, 1972. Professor Weissenberger wishes to
express his appreciation to Paul T. Hafffier, Lori A. Vonder Brink and Jeffrey R. Teeters
for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
2 1d. at 163 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Forseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
3 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992); United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554 (1989); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989);
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554
(1988); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
4 See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 118-23, 150-56 and accompanying text.
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In interpreting a typical statute, the doctrine of legislative intent enjoys
virtually unanimous acceptance as the central guiding principle. 7 While there
may be diverse views as to the method by which legislative intent in a
particular instance is to be determined, 8 there appears to be virtually universal
7 See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 67-86
(1975); HENRYM. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1412 (tent. ed. 1958); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (5th ed. 1992); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 453-61
(1988); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1, 6-13 (1988); Laurence C. Marshall,
"Let Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 177, 201 (1989); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the
Limits ofthe Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J 71, 78-79 (1984).
8 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 7 (summarizing debate on the significance of
legislative intent). But see GunIo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982) (proposing that courts should freely review and revise statutes as legal environment
changes); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930) (arguing that
intent of legislature is undiscoverable). The various principles, canons, and doctrines of
statutory construction are diverse. See generally DICKERsON, supra note 7; SINGER, supra
note 7. The determination and use of legislative intent are currently the subjects of
substantial scholarship and debate. See, e.g., Conference, The Role of Legislative History in
Judicial Interpretation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 361; Symposia, Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 619, 663 (1987). Many scholars have argued for
various means of determining legislative intent by analyzing a statute's legislative history.
James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888-90
(1930) (arguing that legislative records provide accurate and compelling guides to
interpretation); Maltz, supra note 7 (arguing that, absent absolutely clear contrary legislative
history, plain meaning should be enforced); Marshall, supra note 7, at 177, 201 (stating that
courts should implement value choices of legislature); Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims
Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975) (arguing that courts should abandon plain meaning
rule); Redish, supra note 7, at 78-79 (stating that constitutional democracy requires courts
to enforce language and intent of statute). Others advocate a stricter reliance on the statute's
text. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Oiginal Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 59 (1988) (arguing that use of original intent of legislature
increases judicial discretion); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 621 (1990) (favoring text-based interpretations); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law
Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 279, 338-58 (1985) (arguing that words alone
should be used and "legislative intent" has no role). Judge Richard A. Posner has argued
that a judge must adhere to the intent of the enacting legislature and "imagine as best he can
how the legislators who enacted the statute would have wanted it applied to situations that
they did not foresee." Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and
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recognition that the obligation of the courts to follow the intent of the
legislature is derived from principles that seek to preserve the separation of
powers between the branches of government. 9 Contrary to the typical statutory
enactment, however, the Federal Rules of Evidence were developed by a
multibranch process in which the subjective intent of the drafters is
predominantly traceable to the judicial branch. In the case of most of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress' role was primarily to review and ratify
the intent of a coordinate branch of government in its design of rules intended
to operate internally within that branch.10 Only in isolated instances did
Congress actually modify the version of the Rules submitted to it by the
Supreme Court.11 Consequently, this Article seeks to show that under a theory
of separation of powers, the principle of legislative supremacy does not
comport with the unique and extraordinary process which produced the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
A second thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court and its Advisory
Committee, as the primary architects of the Rules, never intended that the
Rules should be subject to principles of statutory construction. Specifically, this
Article will seek to demonstrate that the so-called "plain meaning" doctrine,
predominantly employed as a means of determining legislative intent, is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's design of the Federal Rules of
the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 800, 818 (1983); see also Richard A. Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CI-. L. REv.
263 (1982) (discussing the role of courts in an economic theory of legislative interpretation).
9 As the Supreme Court has stated, "IThe courts'] commitment to the separation of
powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action. . . ." Tennessee Valley
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978); see also sources cited infra notes 74-76.
10 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
1 See infra note 70. Congress has also amended the Rules in certain instances
subsequent to their original adoption: Rule 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions,
and Related Statements, Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, § 1(9), 89 Stat. 805,
805; Rule 412, Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior, Privacy Protection
for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046, 2046-47; Rule
704(b), Opinion on Ultimate Issue, Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 406, 98
Stat. 1837, 2067-68. See Edward R. Becker and Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of
Evidence After Sixteen Years-the Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the
Rides, 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 857, 859 n.4 (1992); see also STEPHEN A. SALZBURG &
MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RuLEs oF EVIDENCE MANUAL 12 (5th ed. 1990) (arguing
that Congressional enactment of the Rules hinders the amendment process and,
consequently, the growth and development of evidence law); Margaret A. Berger, The
Federal Rides of Evidence: Defining and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 255, 277 (1984) (advocating the need for an Advisory Committee to quicken the pace
of reform).
13091992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Evidence. 12 While this Article will not enter the fray of argumentation
addressing the precise role of "plain meaning," it will seek to show that the
Federal Rules of Evidence were never intended to operate as a statute which
would have plain meaning. Rather than being designed as specific mandates,
the Federal Rules of Evidence were consciously drawn with a recognition that
the federal trial judiciary possess substantial inherent discretion in interpreting,
expanding upon, and applying the Rules. 13 This discretion was designed to be
utilized pervasively in the functional application of all the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and by its nature, it is inconsistent with interpreting the Federal
Rules of Evidence under such statutory construction canons as plain meaning.
12 The plain meaning doctrine has been expressed in various ways. Essentially, the
doctrine is as follows: "If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is neither
the duty nor the privilege of the courts to enter speculative fields in search of a different
meaning." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). Commentators have noted
that the plain meaning doctrine has not precluded courts from performing detailed analysis
of legislative history. See SINGER, supra note 7, § 46.01 (discussing plain meaning as a
primary but not exclusive rationale in courts' reasoning); Douglas E. Abrams, The Place of
Procedural Control in Deternining Who May Sue or Be Sued: Lessons in Statutory
Interpretation from Civil RICO and Sedima, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1477, 1492 n.67 (1985);
Becker and Orenstein, supra note 11, at 864 n.22; Randolph N. Jonakait, 7he Supreme
Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REv. 745, 746
(1990); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IoWA L. REv. 195, 195 (1983). However, some recent Supreme
Court opinions have exhibited a rigid application of the plain meaning doctrine to the
exclusion of other interpretational sources and devices. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno,
112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992) ("To respect [Congress'] determination, we must enforce the words
that it enacted."); Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2636
(1991) ("When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be
complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."); Public Citizen v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[it does not foster a
democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult
the spirit of the legislation .... "); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would not permit any of the historical and legislative
material ... to lead me to a result different from the one that [the plain, ordinary meaning
suggests]."); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating that
statutory language expresses Congressional intent); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Committee reports, floor speeches, and even
colloquies between Congressmen ... are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text
of a law and its presentment to the President."). See also Eskridge, supra note 8, at 656-66
(summarizing 1987-89 United States Supreme Court terms and positions of various
justices).
13 See infra notes 118-24, 151-57 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court's treatment of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a
statute undoubtedly has and will result in several unintended and untoward
ramifications, two of which will be themes of this discussion. First, if it is
assumed that the Federal Rules of Evidence are a statute, then any pre-existing
evidentiary doctrine not preserved in the express, "plain language" of the Rules
will be deemed superseded and discarded by the adoption of the Rules.
Likewise, courts will be constrained from creating evidentiary doctrines not
derived from the express, "plain language" of the Rules. Second, if treated as a
statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence will distort the complex and richly
textured nature of judicial discretion which historically has been central to the
operation of all evidentiary rules. Because this discretion has not been
expressly codified, and probably cannot be codified in the Rules, its continued
viability is jeopardized by the application of statutory construction canons to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 14
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STATUTORY IDENTIrY OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
In virtually every case in which the Court has elected to interpret the
textual language of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it has commenced its
analysis with the articulated premise that the Federal Rules of Evidence
represent a piece of legislation to the interpreted in accordance with traditional
14 See infra notes 127-32; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence
402: The Second Revolution, 6 REv. LrrlG. 129 (1987); Edward I. Imwinkelied, The
Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403
Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879 (1988);
Edward J. Irmwinkelied, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): 77 Threat
to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. RFV. 1465 (1985). Professor
Inwinkeiied argues that the Rules have superseded the common law of evidence and that
judges have consequently lost much of their power to fashion exclusionary rules of evidence
based on reliability or public policy. See Becker & Orenstein, supra note 11, at 864 n.23.
Professor Jonakait has espoused a position similar to that of this Article. Jonakait,
supra note 12, at 745-49. He has argued that the Supreme Court's application of the plain
meaning doctrine to the Federal Rules of Evidence "will take away much of evidence law's
dynamic quality, forcing courts to decide cases without considering evidentiary policy." Id.
at 749. He concluded that this interpretational method will lead to results unforeseen and
unintended by the Rules' drafters. Id. Jonakait explored only the effects of statutory
construction canons on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 782 n.152. This Article,
however, primarily seeks to demonstrate that the Court's premise, that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are a statute, is unfounded.
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principles of statutory construction. 15 The premise itself, however, has not
been the subject of analysis by the Court, but rather, it has been simply an
operative assumption in the Court's analysis. 16 Three cases are illustrative.
In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,17 the plaintiff sued a manufacturer
of laundry equipment after he was injured while operating one of defendant's
machines. 18 During the trial, the defendant attacked the plaintiff's credibility by
eliciting admissions that the plaintiff had a criminal record involving
convictions for burglary and related crimes. 19 Although the plaintiff objected to
the use of this evidence, the district court allowed the impeachment on the basis
of Federal Evidence Rule 609(a), and the court of appeals affirmed. 20 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the
circuits as to whether the special balancing test in Rule 609(a)(1) applied to a
witness other than a criminal defendant. 21 Additionally, the Court addressed
whether Rule 609 might be superseded by Rule 403 which balances the
probative value of relevant evidence against the dangers of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, and needless
repetition.22
15 See cases cited supra notes 1-3.
16 See United States Supreme Court cases cited supra notes 1-3. Likewise, several
United States Courts of Appeals opinions reflect the premise that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are subject to traditional canons of statutory interpretation. See, e.g.,
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1991) (Clark, J.,
concurring); United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Donald v.
Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1199 (6th Cir. 1988) (Martin, J., concurring); Campbell v. G-reer,
831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987); McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916,
922 (3d Cir. 1985); Lataille v. Ponte, 754 F.2d 33, 35 (lst Cir. 1985); United States v.
Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1334 (10th Cir. 1979) (McKay, J., dissenting); United States v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1976).
17 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
18 Id. at 506.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 505.
22 Id.; FED. R. EVID. 403. The version of Rule 609(a)(1) then in effect read:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or
established by public record during cross examination but only if the crime: (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
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In analyzing the first issue, the Supreme Court examined the language of
Rule 609 and found that a literal reading of the plain language would compel
"an odd result in a case like this." 23 Literally applying the plain language of
the Rule would compel an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the
same right to the Rule 609(a) balancing test as that granted to a civil
defendant. 24 Such a result, the Court reasoned, could not rationally have been
intended. Following statutory construction principles, the Court was compelled
to go beyond the literal text of the Rule and examine the underlying
developmental history of the Rule itself2 5 From this analysis, the Court
concluded that Rule 609(a)(1) was intended to apply only to criminal cases and
that the term "defendant" in the rule applied only to a criminal defendant (i.e.,
the accused in a criminal case). 26
The second interpretation issue in the Green case was also predicated on
the premise that the Federal Rules of Evidence are a statute. The specific issue
presented was whether Rule 609(a)(1) governed all prior felony conviction
impeachment, such that no discretion may be exercised to benefit any witness
other than the criminally accused, or in the alternative, whether Rule 609's
specific reference to the criminal defendant left Rule 403 balancing available in
the context of other witnesses. 27 The Court stated: "Prodigious scholarship
highlighting the irrationality and unfairness of impeaching credibility with
evidence of felonies unrelated to veracity indicates that judicial exercise of
discretion is in order. If Congress intended otherwise, however, judges must
adhere to its decision." 28 In resolving the issue of the interaction of Rule 403
and Rule 609, the Court did not find any definitive authority within the
legislative history pertinent to the applicability of Rule 403 to Rule 609. In fact,
the Court stated that the "legislative history evince[d] some confusion." 29 To
FED. R. EvWD. 609(a)(1) (emphasis added).
23 Green, 490 U.S. at 509.
24 Id. Considering that in civil cases the roles of plaintiff and defendant are often
assumed without reflecting on such evidentiary consequences and that those roles could
often be reversed, the grant of a right to one and denial of that same right to the other is
clearly improper.
25 Id. at 510-24. The court looked at the entire legislative history, including
communications between the Judicial Advisory Committee and Congress as to Rule 609. Id.
Because Rule 609 was changed by Congress from the form submitted by the U.S. Supreme
Court, its developmental history includes the actions and discussions of both the judiciary
and legislative branches.
26 Id. at 523-24.
27 Id. at 524.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 524-25.
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effectuate the "intent" of Congress, the Court instead looked to a canon of
statutory construction and examined the role of the textual language of a
statute. The Court stated:
A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more
specific rule. See D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208
(1932). Rule 403, the more general provision, thus comes into play only if
Rule 609, though specific regarding criminal defendants, does not pertain to
civil witnesses.30
Based on this principle, which examines the facial qualities of the language of a
statute, the Court concluded that Rule 403 could not operate in conjunction
with Rule 609 to exclude otherwise authorized convictions.
The Court's analysis in Green contains several noteworthy features. First,
the Court's treatment of the text of Rule 609(a) as statutory language was not
extraordinary31 because the version of Rule 609(a) considered in Green was
one of the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence that Congress modified
during the rule-making process. 32 Consequently, in applying statutory
construction principles, the Court first encountered language which, if applied
according to its plain meaning, would compel "an odd result." 33 More
importantly, the Court was able to uncover authentic legislative history,
specific to the Rule in question, that originated in Congress.34 In most
instances, however, the Federal Rules of Evidence will not be accompanied by
such a record of legislative deliberation because the subjective intent regarding
the vast majority of provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence originated in
the judicial branch.
The second noteworthy feature of the Court's decision in Green was the
use of a principle of statutory construction to determine the respective roles of
two distinct Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court found no express discussion
in the history of the Rules that would determine the relative roles of Rule 403
30 Id. at 524.
31 The Court began its analysis by considering the text of the Rule to see if the plain
language answered the question before it. Finding the text ambiguous, the Court then turned
to a detailed review of the Rule's legislative history to determine its correct interpretation.
Id. at 508-23.
32 See id. at 517-20; see also Proposed Rule of Evidence Rule 609 Impeachment Ly
Evidence of Conviction of Crime, 51 F.R.D. 391 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1973); 120 Cong. Rec. 40,894 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 2374 (1974).
33 Green, 490 U.S. at 509.
34 See sources cited supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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and Rule 609,35 and the resolution of the issue was essentially achieved by
resort to a canon of statutory construction which provides that a general
statutory provision will not govern where a more specific rule addresses the
subject.36 While the Court cited other arguments that reinforced the result
indicated by this principle of statutory construction, no definitive history
compelled the result.37 The significance of the Court's analysis lies in its
treatment of the entire body of the Federal Rules of Evidence as an integrated
statute, thereby warranting the use of principles of statutory construction to
determine the interplay among the various provisions of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 38 Consequently, the Court not only uses statutory construction
principles for interpreting specific language of the text of the Rules, but it is
also prepared to use such principles to discern the internal structure of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.39 In essence, the Court assumed that the Federal
Rules of Evidence were designed in accordance with, and in contemplation of,
devices normally attending the structure of a statute.
Another illustration of the Court's treatment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as a statutory enactment is found in Huddleston v. United States.40 In
Huddleston, the accused was charged with possessing five hundred stolen
videotapes. A key element of the charged offense was subjective knowledge
that the tapes were stolen.41 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence
concerning the defendant's involvement in other acts involving stolen
merchandise from the same supplier.42 The district court allowed this evidence
under the second sentence of Rule 404(b) which permits evidence of extrinsic
acts when offered to show a consequential fact other than the actor's
characterological propensity or inclination to behave in a certain manner. 43 The
defendant was convicted, and the court of appeals first reversed the conviction,
but upon re-hearing, affirmed. 44 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction after deciding that the district court was not required to hold a
preliminary hearing to determine whether the government had proven the
"similar act" or "extrinsic act" by a preponderance of the evidence before
35 Green, 490 U.S. at 524-25.
36 Id.
3 7 Id. at 525-27.
38 Id. at 508-09.
39 Id.
40 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
41 Id. at 682.
42 1d. at 683.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 683-84.
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submitting that evidence to the jury. 45 In reaching its determination, the Court
concluded that requiring a preliminary hearing, as well as conditioning
admissibility on proof of the accused's commission of the act by a
preponderance of the evidence, would be inconsistent with the plain language
of Rule 404(b) and the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence.46 The Court
stated:
Petitioner's reading of Rule 404(b) as mandating a preliminary finding by
the trial court that the act in question occurred not only superimposes a level of
judicial oversight that is nowhere apparent from the language of that provision,
but it is simply inconsistent with the legislative history behind Rule 404(b).47
The Huddleston Court concluded that questions of admissibility concerning
the extrinsic act were governed by Rule 104(b), which provides: "When the
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." 48 The significance of
this conclusion, as well as the analysis which led to it, lies in its rejection of
virtually any evidentiary doctrine that is not found on the face of the literal text,
the "plain language," of the Federal Rules of Evidence. If the plain language of
the Rules does not provide for a doctrine of admissibility or inadmissibility, the
doctrine is ostensibly rejected under the Court's interpretation of the Rules of
Evidence. Consequently, the Huddleston decision demonstrates that the
Supreme Court views the Federal Rules of Evidence as a definitive, inclusive
statute which is designed to address and resolve every evidentiary issue. As
will be discussed later in this Article, such a position is inconsistent with the
design of the Rules which was intended to create guidance rather than definitive
resolution of evidentiary issues. 49
Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Bouraily v. United States,50
represents an even more vivid illustration of the Supreme Court's perception of
45 Id. at 689.
46 Id. at 687.
47 1d. at 688.
48 FED. R. EviD. 104(b).
49 See infra notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
50 483 U.S. 171 (1987). The defendant was charged with conspiring to distribute
cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 174. Another individual, Lonardo,
and an undercover FBI agent had arranged the sale by telephone, with Lonardo stating that
a "friend" would distribute the cocaine. Id. at 173-74. The recorded conversation of
Lonardo with the informant, referring to the friend's participation, was admitted against the
defendant under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Id. at 174.
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the Federal Rules of Evidence as a definitive statutory enactment which allows
for no superimposition of additional evidentiary doctrines. In Bouraily, the
Supreme Court interpreted the federal co-conspirator hearsay exception
contained in Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and held that a trial court may consider the
offered hearsay itself in making the preliminary factual determination of
whether a conspiracy existed and whether the statement was made in the
furtherance of the conspiracy. 51 The Court also determined that the offering
party must establish foundational facts pertinent to applying the exception by
sufficient evidence to support a finding of conspiracy by a preponderance of the
evidence.52 While there appears to be some question as to the precise
interpretation of pre-Rule law regarding the requirement of independent proof
for the establishment of a conspiracy, the Court ultimately resolved this issue
by pointing out that precedent for the independent proof requirement was
decided prior to Congress' enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.53
Called the "bootstrapping rule" in Glasser v. United States,54 the independent
proof requirement was not expressly preserved on the face of the Rules. The
Bourlaily Court framed the issue as one of "whether any aspect of Glasser's
bootstrapping rule remains viable after the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. " 55 The Court's resolution of the issue again demonstrated its
treatment of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a definitive, inclusive statute.
Finding that Rule 104 allows the trial court to make the preliminary factual
determinations pertinent to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) by considering any appropriate
evidence, the Court decided that the adoption of the Federal Rules eliminated
51 Id. at 178-79. Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if the
statement:
is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a
representative capacity or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2).
52 Boudaily, 483 U.S. at 178-79.
53 Id. at 177 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)).
54 Glasser, 315 U.S. at 74-75.
55 Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 178.
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any of the safeguards once imposed by Glasser.56 Because the plain language
of the Rules did not expressly preserve the so-called "bootstrapping doctrine,"
the Court found the doctrine to be superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 57 Consequently, the Court summarily dismissed any
argument that the bootstrapping rule represented sound policy which might be
reaffirmed subsequent to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In
essence, any policy considerations were eclipsed by the entertainment of a
fiction that Congress consciously intended to overrule Glasser by adopting
Rule 104. As the petitioner pointed out in Bourlaily, the legislative history was
silent as to whether Congress or the Advisory Committee actually ever
considered the application of Rule 104 to the foundational requirements of the
co-conspirator hearsay exception.58 Nevertheless, by treating the Federal Rules
of Evidence as a statute, the Court not only eliminated the possible
superimposition of additional safeguards to the admissibility of evidence, it
simultaneously eliminated any pre-existing common-law evidentiary safeguard
which would create a higher threshold to the admission of evidence.59
While the Supreme Court has used statutory construction principles in
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence in several other cases, 60 Green,
Huddleston, and Bourjaily are representative illustrations of analyses that result
from an initial premise that the Federal Rules of Evidence are a legislative
enactment. Fundamentally, the analysis always appears to employ the fiction
that Congress possessed a conscious intent regarding the import of the text of
specific Rules, as well as the functional interplay of the various provisions of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. This fiction appears to be anchored to the fact
that congressional legislation was the final step in the process that engendered
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
56 See id. at 186-202 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 178.
58 Id. at 178-79. Congress took no action to revise Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
59 For an extensive analysis of Bourjaily, see Becker and Orenstein, supra note 11, at
869-76. The authors believe that the result was fundamentally incorrect. They argue that
the abandonment of the independent proof requirement violates the agency justification for
admitting co-conspirator statements, fails to address the history and development of this
hearsay exception, and also strengthens the hand of the prosecutor in establishing a
conspiracy. Id. at 873-74.
60 See cases cited supra notes 1-3.
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II. THE DOCTRINE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE RULE-MAKING
PROCESS
The Federal Rules of Evidence became law as a result of a process that
concluded with legislation, 6' and perhaps not surprisingly, the Supreme Court
has treated the Rules as a statute subject to an analysis which commences with
the stated objective of discerning legislative intent. Nevertheless, treating the
Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute for the purpose of interpretation places
undue emphasis on the terminal point of a process in which the judiciary was
the predominant participant.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were conceived in the judicial branch in
1961 when Chief Justice Warren appointed a Special Committee on Evidence
to study the desirability and feasibility of a uniform code of evidence for
federal courts. In response to the affirmative recommendation of the Special
Committee's 1963 Final Report, Chief Justice Warren appointed an Advisory
Committee in 1965 to draft the Federal Rules of Evidence.62 Three drafts of
the Rules were published and circulated for comment before submission to
Congress. 63 Unlike prior procedural Rules, however, when the Supreme Court
promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence on November 20, 1972,64
61 See infra note 69.
62 The Judicial Conference created a Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 1958, 15 (U.S. Government Printing
Office 1958). The subject of evidence rules was referred to this committee and it decided a
special group should be convened to address the question. In 1961, the Judicial Conference
approved a study to determine the advisability and feasibility of uniform rules for federal
courts. Chief Justice Warren then appointed a special committee on evidence. After the
Committee's affirmative recommendation, in its 1963 Final Report, Warren appointed an
Advisory Committee to draft the Federal Rules of Evidence. Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the U.S. District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 175-79
(1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
63 The proposed Rules drafted by the Advisory Committee were approved by the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and then by the Judicial
Conference as a whole. Preliminary Draft, supra note 62, at 173. Copies of the Rules and
accompanying notes were circulated among bench and bar for comments. Revised Draft of
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the U.S. Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 316
(1971) [hereinafter Revised Drajt]. The Rules were then submitted to the U.S. Supreme
Court but sent back to the Committee for further consideration. With more comments, the
Committee made some changes and sent the revised Rules back to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court then transmitted the Rules to Congress. Rules of Evidence for United States
Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 184 (1973) [hereinafter Rules].
64 Rules, supra note 63, at 184-85.
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questions were raised concerning the Court's authority to prescribe certain
Rules. 65 The Rules were promulgated pursuant to congressional enabling
authority granting the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules governing
the practice and procedure of the federal courts, provided that such Rules did
not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." 66 Critics closely
scrutinized several of the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court in an effort
to determine whether the Court had exceeded its authority under the Enabling
Act by prescribing rules that were outside the scope of "practice and
procedure." 67 The debate over whether the Supreme Court had exceeded its
power became moot, however, when Congress intervened in the process with
legislation stipulating that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not take effect
until they were expressly approved by Congress.68 While Congress thereafter
revised the Supreme Court's version of the Rules in specific, isolated
provisions, it did not reconstruct the design of the Rules. Its modifications were
limited to the revision of the specific text of discreet provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and the vast majority of the Supreme Court's version of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the integrity of the structure of the Rules,
were left intact by Congress when the Rules became effective on January 2,
1975.69
An important digression must be made at this juncture of the analysis. In
certain isolated instances a Rule is authentically statutory in nature because the
text was revised by Congress.70 Where Congress chose to alter the Supreme
65 Id. at 185 (Douglas, J. dissenting); see also Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings
Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the Conmittee on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
66 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771-72 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1988).
67 The Supreme Court has the authority to prescribe "Rules of. . . practice and
procedure. . ... " 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771-72 (1988).
68 S. Res. 583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (enacted).
69 The House held hearings on the Rules on January 30, 1974 and passed its version
on February 6, 1974. H.R. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). The Senate, after hearings on
November 21, 1974, passed a different version on November 22, 1974. S.R. 1277, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). A Conference Committee produced the final version and both
Houses agreed to it on December 16-18, 1974. H.R. 1597, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974)
(enacted). Finally, the President signed the Rules on January 3, 1975. Statement on Signing
a Bill Establishing Rules of Evidence in Federal Court Proceedings, Public Papers of the
Presidents, Gerald R. Ford.
70 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 609(a); FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1). For a discussion of Rule
609, see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Rule 804(b)(1), see
United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992) (interpreting the language of Rule
804(b)(1)); Glen Weissenberger, 77w Former Testimony Hearsay Exception: A Stud), in
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Court's version of a particular rule, the modification inescapably represents
substantial legislative intervention, such that the result is a provision of the
Rules that can appropriately be treated in accordance with statutory
construction principles. In fact, the version of Rule 609(a) at issue in Green v.
Bock Laundry, discussed earlier in this Article, is such a provision. 71
Nevertheless, the recognition that certain isolated provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence have a statutory identity highlights the necessity of a fine-
tuned approach to interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Congress'
specific alteration of certain Rules underscores the reality that the majority of
the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence originated in the judicial branch of
government.
Another important digression pertains to the authority of Congress in the
rule-making process. From the perspective of constitutional and statutory
powers, little doubt exists that Congress possesses the ultimate authority in the
rule-making process. 72 In examining the authority to create the Federal Rules
of Evidence and in reviewing the rule-making process as it actually evolved,
the Federal Rules of Evidence inescapably appear to the product of a process
that appropriately concluded with congressional legislation. Even so,
recognizing Congress' ultimate constitutional and statutory authority in the
rule-making process is not tantamount to resolving issues of statutory
interpretation. While the Federal Rules of Evidence may be the result of a
process which concluded with legislation, the process that brought about the
legislation is not typical of that preceding other legislative enactments.
Consequently, the authority to create the Federal Rules of Evidence should not
operate to resolve the question of the manner in which the Federal Rules of
Evidence are to be interpreted.
Turning to the import of the legislative intent doctrine,73 its incongruity
with the Federal Rules should become apparent after a brief explication of the
doctrine. Said to be the touchstone of statutory interpretation, 74 underpinnings
Rulemaldng, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67 N.C. L. REv. 295,
312-36 (1989) (discussing Rule 804(b)(1) and the ramifications of congressional
amendment).
71 See discussion of Green v. Bock Laundry, supra notes 17-39 and accompanying
text.
72 See supra notes 65-68.
73 EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 158 (1940); SINGER,
supra note 7, § 45.05; accord DICKERSoN, supra note 7, at 67; PLATT POTTER, DWARRIS
ON STATUTES 61 (Albany, William Gould & Son 1875).
74 Maltz, supra note 7, at 3 (citing Philbrook v. Glodget, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974); Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 65 (1958)). Commentators have described the
legislative intent doctrine in terms of agency and principal. See, e.g., Frank H.
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of the legislative intent doctrine are constitutionally based on the assumption
that courts have an obligation to construe statutes so that they carry out the
will, real or attributed, of the lawmaking branch of the government.75
Accordingly, the doctrine of legislative intent is mandated by the principles of
separation of powers,76 and the implementation of the legislature's intent has
been described as a constitutionally compelled judicial duty to follow the will
of the legislative branch,77 which prohibits courts from either expanding78 or
narrowing79 statutes passed by Congress. To do otherwise would result in an
"unhealthy process of amending the statute by judicial interpretation." 80
Easterbrook, Foreword: 77ze Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 60
(1984) ("Judges must be honest agents of the political branches."); Daniel A. Farber,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 284 (1989); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 415-41
(1989). Judges are viewed as agents or servants who follow the command of the legislature
which is the principal. Id. at 415. Professor Sunstein explained that the agency approach
appears in the various competing forms of statutory interpretation such as textual and
contextual approaches. Id. Under this theory it is "impermissible for [courts] to invoke
considerations that cannot be traced to an authoritative text." Id.
The doctrine of legislative intent is thought functionally to allocate the law-making
powers and diminish the chance of inappropriate judicial lawmaking. Eskridge, supra note
8, at 654; accord T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 20, 22-23 (1988); Marshall, supra note 7, at 201; Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 19 (1985). Ultimately predicated on
a policy of legislative supremacy, the doctrine reflects the Supreme Court's frequently
articulated position that "the federal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the
judicial branch of government." Id. at 19 (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)). Apart from constitutional issues, judges are subordinate to
legislatures in the making of public policy. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
194 (1978); Farber, supra, at 292.
75 See Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 866 (1824); Priestman v.
United States, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 28, 30 n.1 (1800); Marshall, supra note 7, at 201.
76 SINGER, supra note 7, § 45.05.
77 William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDozo L. REv. 799, 808 (1985).
78 United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365-66 n.11 (8th Cir. 1980)
("[E]xpanding the scope of RICO beyond congressional intent is judicial legislation violative
of the separation of powers doctrine established in the United States Constitution."), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
79 Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 763 F. Supp. 128, 138 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("To narrow
the scope of a statute in contravention to the expressed intent of the framers would usurp the
role of the legislature and encroach on the constitutional separation of powers."), reh'g
denied, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
80 Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Ultimately, the separation-of-powers underpinning of the legislative intent
doctrine is the product of democratic theory,81 and a common argument for
judicial deference to the legislature is frequently cast in terms of the merits of a
political system committed to majority rule.82 Under this argument, enactment
of a statute reflects the will of the majority which should control the non-
majoritarian judiciary, 83 and the judicial branch is deferential to the legislative
branch because the latter is controllable by the electorate. 84 In this context,
Professor Redish has argued that "[t]he essential element of any democratic
society is at least some level of majoritarian self-determination. 85 While our
constitutional democracy does allow the judiciary to invalidate legislation on
the basis of unconstitutionality, the courts' role is otherwise to implement the
intent of the legislative branch. 86
While the foregoing description of the underlying purpose of the legislative
intent doctrine runs the risk of extreme over-simplification, it serves to
illuminate the fundamental reason the doctrine has but a limited role to play in
the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In contrast to Congress'
typical function in creating legislation, Congress' role in enacting the Federal
Rules of Evidence was to approve the internal rules of a coordinate branch of
government where such rules originated within that coordinate branch. The
policies of the separation of powers supporting the doctrine of legislative intent
in this context are misplaced because of the respective roles of the Supreme
Court and Congress in the rule-making process. In this regard, a functional
examination is instructive in identifying the precise nature of Congress' actual
intent in the rule-making process which produced the Federal Rules of
Evidence. First, Congress granted the Supreme Court the authority to design
81 See Maltz, supra note 7, at 9; Marshall, supra note 7, at 201.
82 See Maltz, supra note 7, at 7.
83 Id. at 7-8.
8 4 STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 41 (1985).
85 Redish, supra note 7, at 76.
86 Id. Redish stated that the Court must assume that the legislature intended the courts
"to perform neither more nor less than their traditional function in a constitutional
democracy-to interpret the language and intent of the statute, to enforce it as so construed,
and to invalidate or ignore it only when they find that the law is unconstitutional." Id. at 78-
79; see also United States v. Cheiman, 578 F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Congress has
expressed its purpose in a clear statute, the constitutionality of which is no longer in
question, and the principle of legislative supremacy requires us to enforce the statutory
language."); Farber, supra note 74, at 293 n.57 (stating that Article VI, Section 2 of the
Constitution assumes a court may not disregard federal statutes on non-constitutional
grounds).
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and promulgate the Rules.87 Second, it received the Rules from the Supreme
Court for review.88 Third, to obviate questions of the Rules' constitutional and
statutory legitimacy, Congress extended the effective date of the Rules and
conditioned their enactment upon its express approval.8 9 Fourth, Congress,
through its various committees, sought to discern the import of the Rules as
received from the Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee.9" Fifth,
Congress modified certain discreet provisions of the Rules where it sought to
have its actual intent supersede that of the Supreme Court and its Advisory
Committee.91 Sixth, Congress ensured the validity of the entire process by
affirmatively enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence.92 In thus reviewing the
functional operation of the rule-making process, the distinct nature of
Congress' actual intent becomes apparent. Except in instances in which it
modified the text of certain Rules, Congress' intent was to ratify and enact the
intent of the Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee. Consequently, it is
critical to focus upon whether the Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee
intended the application of statutory construction principles to the interpretation
of the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The following analysis
addresses this issue.
IV. APPLYING TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TO
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ORIGIN
AND DESIGN OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE ROLE OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence Were Not Designed to Have "Plain
Meaning "
It is the thesis of this Article that not only is legislative intent an
inappropriate guiding doctrine for interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence,
but that the Rules were never intended by its architects, the Supreme Court and
87 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771-72 (1988).
88 See discussion of proposed Rules, supra note 63, at 184; see also sources cited
supra note 69.
89 S. Res. 583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (enacted).
90 See H.R. 650, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) (enacted); S.R. 1277, 93d Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1974) (enacted).
91 See H.R. 650, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) (enacted); S.R. 1277, 93d Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1974) (enacted).
92 H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974) (enacted); S.R. 1277, 93d Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1974) (enacted).
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its Advisory Committee, to be interpreted as a statute. Rather, the federal
judiciary designed the Rules to be a source of guidance for the exercise of
powers inherently reposed in federal trial judges, and statutory construction
canons are incompatible with this design.
Of the several canons of statutory construction designed to determine
legislative intent, the most fundamental is the "plain meaning" doctrine. 93 In
determining legislative intent, the United States Supreme Court has looked
primordially at the plain language used, 94 and thereafter, the design of the
whole statute,95 the statute's object and policy, 96 and the act's history. 97 While
there is substantial debate as to the exact use of the express text of a particular
statute being interpreted, 98 there appears to be near universal agreement that
the starting point in analyzing legislative intent is the plain meaning or ordinary
meaning of the statutory language. 99 Cninetti v. United States100 provides a
common framing of the principle: "It is elementary that the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain. . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms." 10 1
While several aspects of the "plain meaning" doctrine are significant to the
instant discussion, foremost of these is simply the recognition that "plain
93 See generally DICKERSON, supra note 7; SINGER, supra note 7.
94 See SINGER, supra note 7, § 46.01.
95 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); SINGER, supra note 7, § 46.01.
96 See, e.g., Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158-60 (relying on design, object, and policy of
several similar statutes); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51-57 (1987)
(interpreting ERISA in fight of its policies and purposes); Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,
462 U.S. 36, 56 (1983) (stating that court should not interpret statute to produce result at
odds with purposes underlying statute); Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)
(If plain meaning leads to an unreasonable result, the Court will "look to the reason of the
enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its
design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning ....").
97 See e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (1991) (stating that courts may
rely on legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
896-97 (1984) (relying on Senate reports and past judicial interpretations in calculating
"reasonable" attorney fees in civil rights case).
98 See sources cited supra note 8.
99 See, e.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982)
("[s]tatutory construction must begin with the language of the statute itself"); see also
sources cited supra note 12.
100 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
101 Id. at 485.
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meaning" is a derivative doctrine of legislative intent and not a doctrine of
independent application. 102 It is not an end, but a means to determining the
intent of the legislature. Consequently, to the extent it represents a doctrine of
constitutional dimension, its constitutional underpinning is derived from
legislative supremacy rather than any inherent constitutional sanctity of
statutory language. 103 As a result, myriad situations exist in which courts may
appropriately discount, ignore or attribute a unique meaning to the plain
language of a statute without threatening the values supporting the separation of
powers. 104 In Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,10 5 for example, the
Court stated that "a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, . . . [may make] it unreasonable to
believe that the legislator intended" a literal interpretation. 10 6 Consequently,
even though the Rules were ultimately enacted into law through legislation, the
plain meaning doctrine does not operate as a constitutional or analytical
obstruction to implementing the intent of the Supreme Court in the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.107 Given the unique
circumstances surrounding the multi-branch rule-making process, the Rules
may be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's intent
surrounding the use of language in the text of the Rules. Building on this
premise, the following discussion will seek to demonstrate that the Supreme
Court and its Advisory Committee selected a textual balance in the Rules which
integrally incorporates a level of judicial flexibility that is antithetical to
statutory construction principles.' 0 8 It is important to bear in mind throughout
this discussion that Congress did not disturb this textual balance in its
102 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
103 Farber, supra note 74, at 288-90; Maltz, supra note 7, at 22; accord Merrill,
supra note 74, at 23. But see Aleinikoff, supra note 74, at 32 (arguing plain meaning
doctrine is political strategy for disciplining judges and legislators).
104 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98
(1974); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 127 (1965).
105 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
106 Id. at 459.
107 In the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court has rejected the plain
meaning of a provision when the purpose and history of the specific Rule in question
indicated a result different than that compelled by the ordinary meaning of the text. For a
discussion of this proposition see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
108 Compare, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) and cases
cited supra note 3.
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ratification of the Rules. Emphasizing a point made previously in this Article,
Congress' role was to ensure the statutory and constitutional legitimacy of the
Rules and to review the Supreme Court's promulgated Rules.' 09 Its role was
either to ratify or alter the Supreme Court's version of the Rules, and in this
role it substituted its intent only in discreet, textual provisions of the Rules. 110
Most important, however, Congress did not recast the Supreme Court's overall
structural design of the use of textual balance in the language of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
To understand the Supreme Court's use of language in the text of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the starting place is the process which created the
textual design of the Rules. The Special Committee on Evidence established by
Chief Justice Warren with the approval of the Judicial Conference was charged
to consider the advisability and feasibility of Rules to govern evidence
uniformly in all federal courts. 111 Upon an affirmative response in the report of
the Special Committee, Chief Justice Warren appointed the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence to draft the actual text of the
Rules."12 The Advisory Committee commenced its task by drawing upon the
previous experience reflected in the Model Code and Uniform Rules of
Evidence. Professor E. M. Morgan, who had previously written the preface to
the Model Code in 1956,113 suggested that the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence be drafted taking the best features of the previous two attempts, the
Uniform Rules and Model Code.114 When the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence transmitted its first draft to the Supreme Court, the
Committee specifically acknowledged "its indebtedness to its predecessors [the
Model Code and the Uniform Rules] in the field of drafting rules of
109 See supra note 69-71; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3402, 3771, 3772; 28 U.S.C. §§
2072, 2075.
110 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
111 Introduction to Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75 (1961).
112 Id. at 113; Preliminary Draft, supra note 62, at 173.
113 Professor Morgan had advocated a generalized approach to codification which
would allow for judicial discretion. Opposing this approach, Dean Wigmore desired less
discretion and a particularized code of evidence. For a further discussion of their debate,
see Michael S. Ariens, The Law of Evidence and tie Idea of Progress, 25 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 853, 859-60 (1992).
114 Edmund M. Morgan, The Uniform Rules and the Model Code, 31 TuL. L. REv.
145, 151-52 (1956).
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evidence." 1 15 It cited not only the actual predecessor codes, but the supporting
studies and commentaries as invaluable for suggesting general approaches. 116
Tracing the text of the Federal Rules to the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules, one can clearly see that the Committee developed a draft which, like
these predecessor codes on which it was based, was never meant to be
interpreted as a statute. 117 The framers of the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules debated the underlying philosophies of textual design extensively, and the
alternatives for the design of a body of evidence rules were finely focused for
the Federal Rules Advisory Committee. In the forward to the Model Code,
Morgan expressed the resolution of its framers as to the specificity of the
Code.118 He explained that there were three courses that could be followed:
[Tio canvass all the situations in which pertinent questions have been
answered by the courts and to devise a mandate to the trial judge for each such
case...; to frame a very few, very broad general principles, and direct the
trial judge to apply them...; [or] to draw a series of rules in general terms
covering the larger divisions and subdivisions of the subject without attempting
to frame rules of thumb for specific situations and to make the trial judge's
rulings reviewable for abuse of discretion . . . . [Tihe choice is between a
catalogue, a creed, and a Code. The Institute decided in favor of a Code. 119
In his scholarly discussion of the Model Code, Professor Mason Ladd
supported this interpretation of the underlying policy of the Code by stating,
"requirements of ritualistic formalism are eliminated." 120 Finally, adopting the
textual balance of the predecessor codes, the framers of the Federal Rules of
Evidence added Rule 102, "Purpose and construction," where there was no
similar Rule in any previous codification. 121 This Rule was added "to insure
115 Preliminary Draft, supra note 62, at 180.
116 Id.
117 For example, Edward W. Cleary, Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence, reflected on the purpose of Rule 102 by stating, "It seems
essential that the Rules contain at some point a provision allowing expansion by analogy to
cover new or unanticipated situations.. . ." Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. Supp. 4 (1973).
118 EDMUND M. MORGAN, Fonvard to MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE 12-13 (1942).
119 Id.
120 Mason Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IowA L. REv. 214, 240 (1942).
121 Rule 102 reads: "These Rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and the promotion of growth
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that the Rules are liberally, not strictly, construed." 122 Consequently, the intent
of the designers of the Federal Rules of Evidence was to "draw a series of
Rules in general terms . . . without attempting to frame rules of thumb for
specific situations." 123 Moreover, by design, the latitude of the trial judge was
integral in applying the language of the Rules. The Rules were to operate as
broad guidance for the resolution of evidentiary issues leaving specific
applications to the discretion of the trial judge. 124
Given Congress' endorsement of the Advisory Committee's design of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, how well does the primary "tool of statutory
construction," the so-called "plain meaning" doctrine, serve the intended
design? First, one must remember that it is a doctrine which is derived from
legislative supremacy, a consideration previously discussed as having very
questionable applicability to rules which were developed by a unique multi-
branch process. 125 Second, the doctrine itself does not command rigid,
unthinking implementation of the literal text of an enactment, particularly
where the circumstances surrounding the enactment would indicate
otherwise. 126 So softened, the doctrine might be applied in such a manner as to
give the textual language passing reference on the way to examining extrinsic
sources which would inform the interpretation process. But in reality, the plain
meaning doctrine is an interpretational device that provides little utility in
interpreting Rules that were never designed in the first instance to have plain
meaning in the statutory sense. In contrast to typical legislation, the Federal
Rules of Evidence were designed as general rules with intentional broad
gaps. 127 By design, the gaps in the Federal Rules are their predominating
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EVID. 102.
122 FED. R. EVID. 102 advisory committee's note.
123 MORGAN, supra note 118, at 13.
124 Id. at 13. The framers of the Federal Rules of Evidence followed the same form of
the Rules and relied on the structural ideologies of the framers of the Model Code. See
supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
126 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
127 Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
74 IoWA L. REV. 413, 414 (1989); accord David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in
Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 937 (1990); David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of
Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1155, 1159 (1992); Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion
in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REv.
1097 (1985). See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
129 (1921); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OFLAW 124 (1961).
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features, 128 and again by design, these gaps are to be addressed with discretion
by the federal trial judge who historically has navigated such gaps with the
guidance of the common-law principles of evidence.129 Consequently, the
intended design of the Rules, and the contemplated role of the federal trial
judiciary, make the actual language of the Rules inherently something other
than plain. 130 At minimum, the preservation or engraftment of additional
128 Even regarding enactments which are unarguably statutory, the literal text is
subject to interstitial expansion by the judicial branch. See Farber, supra note 74, at 293
("Although courts may not violate clearly enacted legislative intent, the supremacy principle
does not prevent them from going beyond such intent in implementing statutory language
when there are gaps in the legislative scheme.").
129 See infra notes 130 and 131.
130 A significant feature of the plain meaning doctrine is that, despite the differing
views concerning its operation, it never actually precludes examination of extrinsic aids to
interpretation. Even the strongest advocates of the primacy of plain meaning demonstrate a
willingness to consider other sources of insight into the intent of the legislature. See cases
cited supra note 12. Accordingly, consistent with the plain meaning doctrine, courts
routinely consider committee drafts and reports, legislators' statements at hearings and
debates, testimony, and the motives of legislators. In considering sources extrinsic to the
text of a statute, courts have also frequently relied on an act's antecedent common law as an
aid to construction. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990) (applying
common law of "falsely made" to criminal title washing statute); Norfolk Redevelopment
and Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30 (1983) (applying
common law of eminent domain to statute granting relocation benefits); NLRB v. Amax
Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) ("Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated
settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a court must infer, unless the
statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of the
terms."); United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988) (arguing that use
of common law to interpret statutes does not usurp Congress' legislative prerogative);
United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Smith, 807 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1986)
(relying on common law to interpret "educational loan"); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
v. Cox, 583 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (N.D. Ala. 1984) ("The common law... furnishes one
of the most reliable backgrounds upon which analysis of the objects and purposes of a
statute can be determined."), aff'd, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985). Common law becomes
an especially important factor when an enactment attempts to restate the common law.
SINGER, supra note 7, § 50.02. The Court has found the common law to be so vital as to
follow a presumption that any statute which purports to invade the common law will be read
favoring the retention of long-established 'and familiar principles. Isbrandtsen Co. v.
Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court stated
in 1875 that "[tihe language of the Constitution and of many acts of Congress could not be
understood without reference to the common law." Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270,
274 (1875). Consequently, the Court often utilizes antecedent common law to construe
specific terms of a statute, and the Court's general practice is to give common-law terms of
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evidentiary doctrines and principles was not precluded, but rather, specifically
contemplated as integral to the structural scheme of the Rules. A primary
author of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Professor Cleary, stated: "[i]n
reality... the body of common law knowledge [of evidence] continues to
exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance .... "131
While some courts have not effectively harmonized such a statement with the
plain meaning doctrine, they have explicitly or implicitly adopted Professor
Cleary's insight. 132
Significantly, the Supreme Court superimposed common-law evidence
principles on the Federal Rules of Evidence in United States v. Abel133 when it
addressed the admissibility of testimony offered to impeach a witness by
showing his or her bias. 134 Noting that the language of the Federal Rules of
Evidence did not expressly address impeachment by bias, the Court indicated
that it would give deference to Congress' review and debate of the Rules even
though the Rules originated from within the judiciary. 135 Nevertheless, the
unanimous Court then relied on several pre-Rules cases to support admission of
testimony to show a witness's bias. 136 The Court concluded that because the
common law of evidence allowed the showing of bias, the testimony was
admissible.137 Had the Court followed its usual line of reasoning, it would
have eliminated impeachment by bias in the same way it discarded the
bootstrapping safeguard of the pre-Rule co-conspirator exception in United
established meaning their common-law meaning. See cases cited supra. Likewise, pre-
enactment common law may be employed in interpreting imprecise terms and in discerning
the purpose of a statute where the text is sought to be reconciled with that purpose. Norfolk
Redevelopment and Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30
(1983).
13 1 Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB.
L. Rnv. 908, 915 (1978).
132 See, e.g., Werner v. UpJohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Congress
did not intend to wipe out the years of common law development in the field of evidence."),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487, 508 (5th Cir.
1977) (stating that pre-Rules cases "fill in the gaps left by the Federal Rules").
133 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
1 3 4 Id. at 49.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 50 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109 (1943); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Alford v. United
States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931)).
137 Id. at 51-52.
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States v. Bourjaily.138 If it had employed the reasoning exemplified by that in
Bouraily, the Court would have concluded that a pre-Rule doctrine which was
not expressly preserved in the plain language of text of the Rules was
eliminated by the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As reasoned in
BourJaily, where Congress constructively knew of the pre-Rule doctrine, it
must have intended, at least fictionally, its elimination where no express
reservation of the doctrine textually appears in the plain language of the
Rules. 139 The Abel case is intriguing in its avoidance of the Court's customary
legislative intent and plain meaning approaches, and it represents the Court's
implicit recognition that its more customary statutory construction analysis may
not serve the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
B. Inherent and Common-Law Judicial Powers Militate Against the
Application of Statutory Construction Tools to the Federal Rules of
Evidence
As developed in the previous section of this Article, the Federal Rules of
Evidence were intended to operate only as general rules for the resolution of
evidentiary issues leaving specific applications to the wide discretion of the trial
judge based upon experience in the common-law tradition. 140 Accordingly, the
design of the Rules is dependent upon the broad range of inherent and
common-law powers that historically have been attributed to federal trial
judges. 141 These powers, which had been fully preserved in the design of the
138 483 U.S. 171 (1987). For a discussion of Bouraily, see supra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text.
139 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987).
140 MORGAN, supra note 118, at 12-13.
141 The principle of legislative supremacy does not prevent courts from filling gaps in
a legislative scheme. Farber, supra note 74, at 293. No legislation can be expected to cover,
in specific detail, every situation that might arise under it. Congress may not have addressed
the specific facts before the court or may have failed to agree on an issue leaving it for the
courts to resolve. Id. The Supreme Court has noted an "inevitable incompleteness presented
by all legislation [which] means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of
the federal courts." United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593
(1973). The Court has concluded that the judicial branch may fill in these interstices to
effectuate an overall statutory scheme or purpose. Id. (quoting Paul J. Mishkin, The
Variousness of "Federal Law" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and
State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957)). Furthermore, this process
of gap-filling has been held to be a legitimate exercise of the courts' authority to interpret
and construe statutes. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir.
1991). This authority to interpret statutes "lies at the very heart of judicial power." Id.
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Rules, provide further support for the conclusion that the Federal Rules of
Evidence were never conceived to operate as a statutory constraint on the
function of the federal trial judiciary in the admission and rejection of evidence.
Had the Rules been designed to overhaul the role of trial judges and
attenuate the broad spectrum of power invested in trial judges, the Rules would
have engendered substantial discussion as to such a reformulation of the
function of the judiciary. The absence of such debate strongly suggests that the
Federal Rules of Evidence were never conceived to depart from established
principles of courts' inherent powers. These powers cover an extremely broad
spectrum of matters pertaining to the conduct of litigation, and they have been
recognized since the earliest days of the federal judiciary. 142 As recently as
1991, the United States Supreme Court stated in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 143
that it would not "'lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from
established principles' such as the scope of a court's inherent powers." 144 In
Chambers the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of inherent powers
to impose sanctions not otherwise stipulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 or in 28 U.S.C. section 1927.145 The trial court found both the rule and the
federal statute to be inadequate, and imposed sanctions under its inherent
judicial power. 146 The Court found nothing in the rule or statue which
142 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (exclude evidence tainted
by illegal search); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975) (require production of
previously recorded witness statements); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (bar
criminal defendant from trial); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (dismiss a
suit sua sponte for failure to prosecute); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322
U.S. 238 (1944) (vacate judgment upon proof that it was obtained by fraud); Ex Parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1874) (punish for contempt); Ex Parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 529 (1824) (control admission to the bar and discipline attorneys); Anderson v.
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) (impose silence, respect, and decorum); G. Heilman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Inherent authority
remains the means by which district judges deal with circumstances not proscribed or
specifically addressed by rule or statute, but which must be addressed to promote just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
143 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
144 Id. at 2134 (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982)).
145 Id. at 2140.
146 Id. at 2131. Chambers and his attorneys attempted to deprive the trial court of
jurisdiction by acts of fraud, filed false pleadings, and attempted expensive, harassing, and
oppressive conduct before, during, and after trial to force NASCO to give up its suit. Id.
NASCO sought the assistance of the trial court and moved for contempt and sanctions
against Chambers and his attorneys under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C. §
1927, and the court's inherent authority. Id. at 2130-31. The trial court had found that
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repealed, modified, or substituted for the trial court's inherent power which, it
stated, "[may] be invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the
same conduct." 147 Therefore, the Court concluded that where "neither the
statute nor the rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent
power" 148 which "must continue to exist to fill in the interstices.' 49 Evident
from decisions such as Chambers is that legislation on a particular subject will
not in itself preempt inherent judicial discretion which would address the same
matter. Applying this reasoning to the Federal Rules of Evidence, nothing in
the Federal Rules appears designed to limit in any way courts' inherent judicial
powers. In fact, the developmental history of the Rules, which has been
discussed in the previous section, demonstrates that the broad range of judicial
powers exercised under the common law were intended to be integral in the
operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because the Federal Rules of
Evidence were designed not only to preserve but to implement the inherent
powers of the federal trial judge, their application depends upon a horizon of
latitude that is not, and probably cannot be, specified within the "plain
language" of the Rules. Rather, inherent judicial powers are a contextual
background within which the Rules are to be interpreted and applied, and the
textual language of the Rules must be measured accordingly.
The appropriate consideration of inherent judicial power in the
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is illustrated by an examination
of the function of Rule 403. Rule 403 codifies the long standing power of the
trial judge to exclude evidence where the relevancy of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 150 Rule 403, while plain enough
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, being limited to papers filed with the court, could not
reach Chambers' out-of-court conduct. Id. at 2131. Statutory sanctions, under 28 U.S.C. §
1927, were not sufficient because they applied only to attorneys and could not be used to
sanction Chambers himself. Id.
147 Id. at 2135; see also G. Heilman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648,
653 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that district judges retain inherent authority to deal with
circumstances "not proscribed or specifically addressed by rule or statute").
148 Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136.
149 Id. at 2134.
150 See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's notes; GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN
INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 1.7, 2.5 (1987); Marvin V. Ansubel, Federal
Rules of Evidence-Article IV Relevance and its Limits, in RESOURCE MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 27, 30 (ALI-ABA ed. 1975); Mengler, supra note 127, at
427. Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
[Vol. 53:13071334
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
in its language, cannot be appropriately interpreted except with an
understanding of the inherent powers of a federal trial judge which had
historically developed long before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Rule 403 is a direct descendent of the antecedent common law, and
its lineage is traceable through the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model
Code of Evidence. Because the Model Code of Evidence was the first attempt
to codify the Rules of Evidence, it necessarily drew upon the common-law
traditions in evidence. In the Forward to the Model Code, Professor Morgan
wrote that Model Rule 303, the predecessor to Federal Rule 403, tempers all
the other Rules under which such evidence may be admissible. 151 The
comment to Rule 303 stated that its application was case specific, and that other
rules of evidence such as those governing hearsay and opinion evidence, which
may operate to admit certain items of evidence, were subject to the
exclusionary force of Model Rule 303.152 The commentary supporting Model
Rule 303 suggested that it was a restatement of established common-law
practice, not a revision. Wherever the Model Code recommended a change
from common-law traditions, the drafters inserted a section in the comment
entitled, "Comparison with Existing Law," 153 and the Comment to Model Rule
303 contains no such section. 154 In drafting the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Supreme Court's Advisory Committee expressly considered the Model Code
and its successor, the Uniform Rules of Evidence,155 and implemented those
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
151 MORGAN, supra note 118, at 14-15. Model Rule 303 provided:
(1) The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative
value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or
(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the
issues or of misleading the jury, or
(c) unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable ground to
anticipate that such evidence would be offered.
(2) All Rules stating evidence to be admissible are subject to this Rule unless the
contrary is expressly stated.
152 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303 advisory committee's note (1942).
153 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 301 and accompanying comment
(1942).
154 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 303 advisory committee's note (1942).
155 In the Uniform Rules of Evidence the principles embodied in Model Code Rule
303 were contained in Rule 45, which provided:
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provisions of the Model Code and the Uniform Rules which, within its
wisdom, would be consistent with the design and function of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 156 Rule 403 is the traceable descendent of Model Rule 303,
embodying the same restatement of the common-law judicial power to exclude
truth-corrupting evidence, including evidence otherwise admissible pursuant to
a distinct rule. 157
The incompatibility of the judicial power codified in Rule 403, the most
fundamental rule of inadmissibility, with canons of statutory construction
should be apparent. 158 Under statutory construction principles, the statute's
language is effectuated in accordance with the plain meaning of the text.159
Such an approach is at tension with a rule whose primary function is not to
instruct the trial judge how to behave, but rather to declare the authority of the
trial judge to exclude evidence within his or her discretion. The actual language
of Rule 403 provides virtually no guidance whatsoever in establishing standards
for the exclusion of evidence. The textual cataloguing of certain counterweights
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that
its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, or (c)
unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to
anticipate that such evidence would be offered. This code has added the term
"substantially," but retains the judge's basic discretion to exclude based on prejudice,
time efficiency, and surprise.
UNWF. R. EVID. 45 (1945). The Uniform Rules added the term "substantially" to the
language of Rule 303 of the Model Code.
156 See supra note 150.
157 In the first draft of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, the Rule mandatorily
directed the trial judge to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value was
substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or misleading the jury,
while maintaining the judge's discretion pertaining to exclusion based upon considerations
of time efficiency. Preliminary Draft, supra note 62, at 225 (1969). The Advisory
Committee Notes which accompanied the draft called attention to the difference. Id. at 225-
27. The Department of Justice and some senators, as well as members of the bench and bar,
opposed the dichotomy, especially the mandated exclusion subpart. 2 DAviD W. LouisELL
AND CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 124 (Rev. ed. 1985); 1 JAcK B.
WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 403-07 (1988). During
the period of comments to the Rules, these concerns were heard and the change was made
to the current form.
158 For a discussion of statutory construction principles, see supra notes 7-14 and
accompanying text.
159 For a discussion of the plain meaning doctrine, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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of relevancy cannot, except symbolically, capture the literally infinite variety of
multifaceted situations in which Rule 403 might be applied to exclude evidence.
Rather, the text of Rule 403 serves the purpose of according, or more
accurately, reaffirming the inherent authority of the trial judge to exclude
evidence which might adversely affect the integrity of the fact finding process.
Consequently, viewing the Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute subject to the
constraints of statutory construction principles misconceives the role of the trial
judge in applying the Rules and overly emphasizes the facial qualities of the
text. 160 In this context, a critical analysis of the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Green v. Bock Laundry1 61 is illustrative. Among the issues considered
in Green was whether Rule 609(a) governs all prior felony impeachment, such
that no discretion may be exercised to benefit civil parties, or in the alternative,
whether the specific reference to the criminal defendant in Rule 609(a) leaves
Rule 403 balancing available in the context of civil cases. 162 The Court
resolved this issue by applying statutory construction principles to the textual
language of Rule 609 and 403. The Court stated: "The general statutory rule
usually does not govern unless there is no more specific rule. . . . Rule 403,
the more general provision, thus comes into play only if Rule 609, though
specific regarding criminal defendants, does not pertain to civil witnesses." 163
Applying this principle of statutory construction, the Court concluded that Rule
403, the "general rule," does not apply in a civil case to felony convictions
authorized to be admissible under the "specific rule," the version of Rule
609(a) then in effect. 164 Such a result, however, is inconsistent with the
traditional conception of the discretion of a trial judge to exclude prejudicial
and confusing evidence. Rule 403, when traced to its common-law origins,
should be interpreted as a rule which reflects the trial judge's common law and
inherent power to exclude evidence that is otherwise admissible pursuant to a
distinct Federal Rule of Evidence.1 65 This inherent and common-law authority
of the trial judge, now codified in Rule 403, was found in Green to be
inapplicable to Rule 609 because of statutory construction principles. Such a
result, however, is contrary to the design of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Had the Court in Green not commenced its analysis with the initial premise that
160 See Waltz, supra note 127, at 1120 (questioning the ability of the trial judge to
accurately assess probative value and countervailing prejudice, and advocating guidelines to
assist judges in exercising their decision-making authority).
161 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
162 Id. at 505.
163 Id. at 524.
16 4 Id. at 526.
165 See supra notes 150-57.
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the Federal Rules of Evidence are a "statutory enactment," it may have traced
the history of the powers codified in Rule 403 through the Uniform Rule and
the Model Code to its common-law origins. Such an approach would have
resulted in the conclusion that Rule 403 may appropriately operate to exclude
evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 609, and such an analysis would
have been more fully consistent with the ideological structure of the Rules as
envisioned by the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee and ratified by
Congress. Nevertheless, the Court reached a result which is at odds with
traditional notions of the inherent powers of a trial judge, and which is not
mandated by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, to understand the
role of Rule 403, one must understand the role of a trial judge as preserved by
the structural design of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and this role of the trial
judge will be consistently subverted where the Federal Rules of Evidence are
treated as a statute subject to statutory construction principles. 166
V. CONCLUSION
In interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute, the Supreme
Court has not only commenced with an unfounded premise but it has also
reached results never intended by the originators of the Rules. Consequently,
by embracing the misplaced fiction that Congress possessed "legislative intent"
in designing the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court has discarded common-
law safeguards in the admission of distinct criminal acts of the accused under
Rule 404(b); 167 it has similarly abandoned safeguards attending the application
of the conspirator hearsay exception; 168 it has misapplied the traditional
function of Rule 403 in tempering all other Federal Rules of Evidence; 169 and
it has diluted the traditional discretion of the federal trial judge. 170 Most
significantly, it has recast the method of interpreting evidentiary principles in a
manner that ignores the wisdom of the common-law history of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the capability of enlightened growth. Moreover, in
166 Congress' action regarding the Rules of Evidence demonstrated no intent to alter
the way in which both the Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee intended the Rules to
be interpreted. Even where Congress modified certain textual provisions of the Rules, such
as Rule 609(a), consistent with the overall design of the Rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court and its Advisory Committee, Congress at least implicitly acknowledged that its own
changes would be subject to the overall structural design of the Rules themselves.
167 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 27-30, 150-65 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 14, 127-32 and accompanying text.
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assuming the Federal Rules of Evidence are a statute, the Court appears to have
neither weighed the consequences nor examined the substantive and common
sensical defects of this assumption.
This Article has sought to demonstrate that the keystone premise of the
Supreme Court's method of interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
so questionable that it warrants sober reevaluation by the Court. The
characterization of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute is not supported
by the developmental history of the Rules, nor does this characterization
function effectively in fostering the growth of the law of evidence in a manner
that is appropriately informed by the common-law heritage of the Rules or
guided by the inherent discretionary powers of the federal trial judiciary.

